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MIRANDA RIGHTS IN A TERRY STOP:

THE

IMPLICATIONS OF PEOPLE V. JOHNSON
DAVID M. CONNER,* STANLEY

L. GARNETT,**

AND ANDREW W. LOEWI***

INTRODUCTION

One of the most frequently litigated issues in criminal law, from
traffic tickets to first degree murder cases, is whether to suppress incriminating statements made by a suspect during the course of the initial
police contact. In making this determination, a court must balance the
government's interest in effective law enforcement against the protections afforded an individual under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.' In Miranda v. Arizona, 2 the Supreme
Court held that police questioning of a suspect who was "in custody"
must be preceded by the now familiar Miranda advisement, and by a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver by the suspect of his fifth
amendment rights. 3 In Terry v. Ohio, 4 handed down two years after Miranda, the Court sanctioned the so-called "stop and frisk," which includes reasonable inquiries by a police officer regarding a suspect's
B.A., Dartmouth College, 1976;J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1980.
B.A., University of Colorado, 1978;J.D., University of Colorado, 1982.
SB.A., Grinnell College, 1971;J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982.
Messrs. Conner, Garnett, and Loewi are Deputy District Attorneys in Denver, Colorado.
1. The fourth amendment governs unreasonable seizures, the fifth amendment embodies the privilege against self-incrimination. The fourth amendment, in pertinent part,
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
The fifth amendment, in pertinent part, provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Although the amendments are distinct, they are nevertheless related. Justice Bradley,
for the Court in Boyd v. United States, addressed the intimate relation between the two
amendments:
For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 478. The fear voiced by ChiefJustice Warren in Miranda was that the custodial setting had a tendency to elicit involuntary confessions by exerting psychological pressures on a defendant. Id. at 448-58, 460-61.
The Miranda advisement would be required whether someone was in custody, or had
his freedom of movement "deprived in any significant way." Id. at 444, 477. Officers need
not advise the suspect in any precise or ritualistic litany; substantial compliance will suffice.
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981). Comment, Crimnal Law." The .'ccnsed Rights to
Miranda ll'anings-Or Their Functional Equivalent, 21 WASHBURN l,.J. 427 (1982).
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
*

*
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activities. 5 The Court held that although based upon less than probable
cause, such a seizure was permitted by the fourth amendment."
There is a pronounced distinction between a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and a "seizure" under Terry. Miranda was meant to
relieve the hardship imposed upon a defendant when significant restraints of his liberty, comparable to an arrest, exert coercive pressures
on him, yielding an "involuntary" confession in violation of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Terry, on the other
hand, defined the circumstances under which a police officer may detain
and question an individual by applying the "reasonableness" requirement for a "seizure" under the fourth amendment. Despite the apparent lucidity of this distinction, the Colorado Supreme Court, in the
recent case of People v. Johnson,7 equated "seizure" with "custody," maintaining that the standards used to determine each are identical.,
This article will discuss the serious problems created by People v.
Johnson. In equating the fourth amendment concept of seizure with the
fifth amendment concept of custody, the Colorado Supreme Court has
ignored the careful analytical distinctions between Terry and Miranda,
distinctions which were intended to resolve problems arising from two
different types of police-citizen contact. Moreover, if "seizure" is
equivalent to "custody," then Johnson compels the conclusion that Miranda warnings are to be rendered as a predicate to any investigatory
questioning conducted in the course of a Terry stop. Such a conclusion
squarely conflicts with the teachings of the United States Supreme
Court, as most recently articulated in Berkemer v. McCarty,9 and threatens
to emasculate the Terry stop as an effective tool of law enforcement.

I.

MVIRAND..I,

TERRY AND BERKEMER: THE SUPREME COURT GRAPPLES

WITH INTERROGATION DURING DETENTION

Few decisions are of greater importance to the criminal practitioner
than Miranda and Terry. Although each arose from a distinct factual situation, and were decided under different constitutional doctrines, it is
nevertheless possible to misconstrue the two rulings and their applications. This is due, in part, to the fact that there is no clear line between a
simple Terry stop and a custodial interrogation under Miranda; the possibility for overlap is as great as the fact patterns are diverse. A review of
Miranda, Terry, and their progeny will clarify their application and pro5. Id. at 30. The issue of the admissibility of statements made by a suspect during
the course of a Tervy stop has not been frequently litigated. This is due in part to the fact
that Terry stop cases generally deal with the suppression of physical evidence seized pursuant to the pat-down search or frisk. Similarly, most inculpatory statements are made following actual arrest of the suspect. See Weisgall, Stop, Searic. and Seize: The Eiiieigin
Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F.I.. REv. 219 (1974).

6. 392 U.S. at 22.
7. 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983), afd,681 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1984) (aflirming trial Court's
holding on remand).

8. 671 P.2d at 962.
9. 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984).
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vide the needed context within which the Colorado Supreme Court's
decisions must be viewed.
Four cases were consolidated for appeal in Miranda v. Arizona, I0 all
involving self-incriminating statements made by individuals while in custody and subject to police interrogation. I I In each case, the defendant's
statements were made before any advisement concerning the rights of
an accused was given.' 2 Two years earlier, the Court had addressed a
similar situation in Escobedo v. Illinois,13 ruling that certain incriminating
statements made by a defendant during a custodial interrogation were
constitutionally inadmissible on the grounds that the failure to apprise
the defendant of his right to a lawyer and his right to remain silent was a
denial of his sixth amendment right to counsel. 1 4 In Miranda, the Warren Court granted certiorari to further develop the rule regarding incriminating statements elicited during a custodial interrogation and to
provide concrete guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to
follow. 15

The Supreme Court in Miranda held that before a suspect who was
in custody could be subjected to interrogation, he must be advised of his
right to remain silent and of his right to either retained or appointed
counsel. Furthermore, if a defendant should choose to waive his rights,
that waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. 16 The Court in
Miranda perceived that the traditional safeguard of voluntariness under
the due process clause simply was not sufficient to protect against the
evils inherent in long term, incommunicado interrogation at a police station. 17 The Court quoted at length from various of "the most recent
and representative"'

8

of police manuals to illustrate the pervasive prac-

tice employed by police in custodial interrogations of obtaining a psychological advantage over a suspect so as to elicit a self-incriminating
response. The Court nevertheless recognized that volunteered confessions are still a viable aspect of law enforcement, and such statements
are admissible in evidence when freely given without coercive pressures. I ' However, when a suspect is both in custody and subject to in10. Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); Miranda v. Arizona, 98
Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965); California v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1965); Vignera v. New York, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857, 207 N.E.2d 527
(1965).
II. Miranda, 384 U.S. 491-98.
12. id.
13. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14. Id. at 490 (holding that when a police investigation has gone beyond a general
inquiry, and has subsequently become focused on a particular suspect who has been denied a request for counsel, and also has not been advised of his rights, self-incriminating
statements made during the course of a custodial investigation are inadmissible).
15. liranda. 384 U.S. at 443. Unlike Esrobedo. the inquiry in Viraildn was directed at
the privilege against selfincrimination.
16. Id. at 478.
17. Id. at 444, 477.
18. Id. at 448. See al.,o F. lNBslAt&J. REID. (RIMINA.
INTERRO;A'T ION AN) CONFESSIONS
(1962): C. OIARA. FtNtD)AMENTAI.S O CRIMINAL INVESrI(;AION (1956).
19. 384 U.S. at 457-58. Prior to Miranda, the test for admission of cotlessions was
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terrogation, the Court concluded that Miranda safeguards apply.-2
The Miranda decision held that warnings are required whenever a
suspect is "deprived of his freedom in any significant way." '2 1 The trend
immediately thereafter was to interpret Miranda as applying only to station house questioning because the primary concern was with longterm, incommunicado interrogation. The Supreme Court clarified that
Miranda was not confined to the station house in Orozco v. Texas, 22 in
which it held that Miranda warnings should have been given to a suspect
who was awakened at four a.m. in his bedroom and immediately ques23
tioned by four armed and uniformed police officers.
By contrast, in Oregon v. Mathiason,2 4 the Court clarified that even
questioning conducted at the station house is not necessarily "custodial." In Mathiason, the Court dealt with the admissibility of inculpatory
statements made by the defendant to police. 2 5 A burglary victim gave
police the name of the only suspect of whom she could thinkMathiason. 2 6 Three weeks after the crime, an officer attempted to contact this suspect but was unsuccessful and left his card and a note at the
27
defendant's residence requesting that the defendant call police.
Mathiason did call and was asked to meet with the officer at a police
station that same day. 28 The defendant complied. 29 In a room with the
door closed, the officer told the defendant that he was not under
arrest. 30 The officer then asked the defendant about the burglary and
falsely told the defendant that his fingerprints had been found at the
whether they were "voluntary." Kamisar, Involuntary Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728
(1968).
20. 384 U.S. at 467. The question of what constitutes interrogation was resolved in
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The Supreme Court found that interrogation
means any statement by a police officer which is designed to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 301. See also People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 589 (Colo. 1981); Grano, Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM,. L. REV. 1 (1979); Kamisar,
Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation?" When Does It Matter?, 67
GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (1978); White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of
His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (1979); White, Interrogation Without Questions
Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1980);
Note. Rhode Island v. Innis: A Heavv Blow to the Rights of a Suspect in Custody; and No "Christian Burial" to Ease the Passage,41 LA. L. REV. 928, 929 (1981); Note, The Meaning of"Intei'ogation" Under Miranda v. Arizona: Rhode Island v. Innis, 12 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 725, 734

(198 1); Comment. Rhode Island v. Innis-CriminalPocediiie-FifthAiendnienit-interrogatioi
in Violation of Miranda Includes Not Only Direct Questioning But also Conduct Police Officers Knew or
Should Have Known Ilould Elicit an Incriminating Response, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (1981);
Comment, Criminal Procedure Defining Interrogation Under Miranda, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 434,
441 (1981).
21. 384 U.S. at 478.
22. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
23. 394 U.S. at 326. For a discussion of Oio-co. see Comment, Custodial Interrogation
and Res Gestae 'nder Miranda, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 88 (1970).
24. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
25. Id. at 493.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28.
i.
29. Id.
30. 1d.
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scene of the crime. 3 ' The defendant then confessed. 3 2
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, upheld the use of the
defendant's confession against him at trial, relying heavily on the fact
that the defendant's freedom of movement was not inhibited by the police and that after having confessed he was permitted to leave the police
station. 33 As a result, the Court concluded that "Mathiason was not in
custody 'or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' -34 The Court went on to note that
such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes
that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a coercive
environment. Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a
police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of
the fact that the police officer is a part of a law enforcement
system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged
with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer
35
Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.
Finally, the Court held that a Miranda advisement is not required merely
because the questioning transpires at a police station or "because the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect." 13 6 The facts of
Mathiason present circumstances more coercive and more custodial than
the situation that confronted the Colorado Supreme Court in Johnson,
yet the Mathiason Court recognized that specific factual circumstances
that fall short of custody do not call for an advisement of rights. The
seminal case of Terry v. Ohio illustrates this proposition.
In Terry, a veteran police officer observed Terry and two others en37
gaged in suspicious activity focused upon a particular store window.
After confronting the suspects, asking for their names, and receiving no
response, the officer abruptly patted Terry down, thereby discovering a
pistol in a pocket of Terry's overcoat. 3 8 A subsequent search disclosed
that Terry was carrying a .38 caliber revolver and that one of Terry's
cohorts also possessed a concealed weapon. 3 9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the search violated the defendants' fourth amendment rights. 40 The broader issue before the Court
was when, if ever, might a police officer detain a suspect to investigate or
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 493-94.
34. Id. at 495.
35. 1(1.
36. Id. See also Note, Custodial Interrogation After Oregon v. Mathiason, 1978 )1KE L.J.
1497, 1499, 1505 (1978); Comment, "In Custod?'" .4 Relaxation of Miranda. 23 1oy. I.
REv. 1057, 1059-60 (1977); Comment, Ointnal Procedure-Defining "Custodial Iterogation""
For Piposes of Miranda: Oregon v. Mathiason, 57 OR. . REv. 184 (1977).
37. 392 U.S. at 6.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8.
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prevent a crime without probable cause for arrest. 4 I
The Court first laid an analytical foundation, holding that every
stop and frisk is governed by the fourth amendment:
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
"seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture
of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of
the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his'4 2or her
body in an attempt to find weapons is not a "search."
Applying a fourth amendment analysis, the Court held that any involuntary detention by a police officer must meet the fourth amendment requirement of "reasonableness, ' 4 3 which involves "balancing the need
for the search [or seizure] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails."' 44 Addressing the facts of Terry, Chief Justice Warren
stated that the officer must advance "specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." '45 The Court applied a two-part analysis: whether
the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstance which first justified the
intrusion.
The Court did not hold, as Justice Douglas argued in his dissent,
that only an arrest based on probable cause could be a reasonable detention under the fourth amendment. 4 6 Rather, it deferred to the government's interest in "effective crime prevention and detection" and the
need to authorize "necessarily swift [police] action predicated upon onthe-spot observation of the officers on the beat."'4 7 The Court implicitly
acknowledged that a police officer must be able to forcibly detain a citizen, even without probable cause to arrest, for effective crime prevention. However, because Terry not only permits a pat-down search and a
brief seizure of a person, but also "reasonable inquiries" of that person, 4 8 how does Terry relate to the privilege against self-incrimination
4 I. Id. at 10. Terpy has received substantial attention in the academic community. See,
e.g., LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Comstitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
Micii. L. REV. 40 (1968). LaFave addressed the course of a Terty stop and determined that
generally, such situations were not custodial because the suspect was not "swept away" to
"unfamiliar surroundings," and then held and questioned incommunicado. Id. at 95-106.
See aLto Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: l'hat Constitutes Custodial intef'ogation?. 25 S.C.L. REV. 699 (1974) (trend toward admittance of statements made during onthe-scene questioning). See generally Platt, The Limits of Stop and Frisk-Questions O'answered
by Terry, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 433-35 (1968) (reviewing trends immediately after Terry):
Stern, Stop and Fiisk: ,In HistoricalAnsU'erto a lodern Problem, 58J. CRIM. .. CRIMINOLOGY &
'o.CE Sci. 532 (1967) (advocating that stops with questioning significandy deterred criminal activity during the pre-7erir era).
42. 392 U.S. at 16. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (stopping ofa
vehicle on the highway is a "seizure"); Comment, Delaware v. Prouse: Dilution o/ Fointh
limendmnent Rights it# Constitutional Balancinkg, 57 DENx. .1. 345 (1980).
43. 392 U.S. at 19-22.
44. /d. at 21 (citing Caniara v. Municipal Ct_, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 35-39 (Douglas..].. dissenting).
47. Id. at 20.
48. I. at 30.
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addressed in Miranda?
The extent of the inquiries permitted under Terry remained unclear
for a number of years. The United States Supreme Court touched on
this issue in Florida v. Royer:4 9 "Although not expressly authorized in
Terry, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce....

was unequivocal in saying that

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure
'5
for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop. 0
Yet, Royer did not resolve the question: if a predicate for Miranda is that
the suspect be in custody or have his freedom deprived in any significant
way, and Terry permits a forcible detention of a suspect for investigation
and reasonable inquiries, when does the forcible detention in Terry become a "significant deprivation of freedom" for the purposes of Miranda, thus making advisement of rights mandatory?
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 5 1 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Marshall, addressed this issue in the context of a routine
traffic stop of an automobile. 52 In Berkemer, the defendant was stopped
for investigation of driving under the influence of either alcohol or
drugs. 53 Prior to arrest, but while forcibly detained, the defendant was
asked several questions and he made incriminating replies. 54 He was
then arrested and taken to the police station where he was questioned
again and made further damaging statements. 5 5 At no time was he ad56
vised of his Miranda rights.
The Court suppressed all statements in response to interrogation
made after the arrest because there was no Miranda advisement. 5 7 It did
not, however, suppress the statements made during the course of the
stop. 5 8 Analogizing the traffic stop with a Terry stop, the Court held that

a traffic stop itself was a seizure under the fourth amendment. Justice
Marshall noted:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the
49. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
50. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975)).
Although Brignoni-Ponce involved a border search to asertain the status of a vehicle's passengers, it has consistently been cited as a Terry case without reference to its particular fact
pattern. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
51. 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984).
52. Strictly speaking, the Berkemer opinion was not unanimous. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but felt the issue was not properly before the Court. 104 S. Ct.
3153-54 (Stevensj., concurring). Justice Stevens believed the sole issue on certiorari was

whether .liranda was applicable to misdemeanor arrests. He was distressed by the fact that
Berkemer s holding went considerably further. While Berkemer held that .1irandadid apply to
misdemeanor arrests, the issue of whether the full panoply of criminal procedure rights

accompany traffic stops or arrests is an interesting one. For discussions of some of these
issues, see Comment, Search Incident to Custodial .. rmest for Traffic Iiolation, II AM. CRIM. ..
REv. 801 (1973); Comment.4 Lawful Custodial.Inrestfor a Traffic I iolation
Justifies
a Full .Search
oJ'the
.Irrestee. I I Hous. L. REv. 1283 (1973); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 3d 1076 (1969).
53. 104 S.Ct. at 3142.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
/d.
Id.

57. Id. at 3148.
58. Id.at 3152.
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passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of
most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman's signal to
stop one's car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission .... Certainly few motorists would feel free either
to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the
scene of a
59
traffic stop without being told they might do so.
The defendant argued that Miranda warnings should have been
given prior to the questions asked during the traffic stop because the
60
defendant had been "deprived of his freedom in a significant way."
The Court emphatically rejected this contention. It held:
we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent.
[W]e have held [that] a policeman who lacks probable cause but
whose "observations lead him reasonably to suspect" that a
particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to "investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion."... "[T]he
stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the
just*ication for their Initiation.' " Typically, this means that the
officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. . . .The comparatively
nonthreateningcharacterof detentions of this sort explains the absence of
any suggestion
in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates
6
of Miranda. '
Berkemer clarified what was implicit in the Terry and Miranda doctrines as they developed: that when determining the applicability of Miranda to an initial contact short of arrest, practicing lawyers and trial
judges must do more than ask whether the defendant was free to leave,
or seized under the fourth amendment. The issue that must be addressed is whether the person detained has also been "subjected to
treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes." 6 Colorado decisions addressing this issue have sent practitioners mixed
messages.
II.

PEoPL. v JoILxS.vo: COLORADO EQUATES CUSTODY WITH SEIZURE

With its decision in People v. Johnson,"3 the Colorado Supreme Court
appeared poised to require Miranda warnings prior to any questioning
made in the course of an investigatory stop. In order to understand how
the Colorado court arrived at a position seemingly in conflict with that
of the Berkemer Court, it is necessary to briefly examine the Colorado
59. Id. at 3149.
60. Id. at 3148.
61. Id. at 3149-51 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422
U.S. 873, 881 (1975)).
62. 104 S. Ct. at 3151.
63. 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983). qlr[d,
681 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1984).
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doctrinal history of both the fourth amendment concept of the investigatory stop and the fifth amendment concept of custody.
A.

The Colorado Supreme Court Adopts and Interprets Terry.

The investigatory stop in Colorado was sanctioned three years after
Terry in the seminal case of Stone v. People.64 Impliedly following Terry,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that although an investigatory stop
was a "seizure" under the fourth amendment, such a stop could be
made for limited purposes upon less than probable cause. 6 5 While Stone
specifically authorized police questioning only to ascertain a suspect's
name and address, the court was quick to recognize, as had the commentators, that "the right to interrogate during a 'stop' is the essence of
Terry and its progeny.' '66 Only four months after Stone, the court further
noted that "there is an area of proper police practice in which less than
67
probable cause may still justify temporary detention for questioning."
The Colorado court's enthusiasm for the Stone stop as a tool for
police questioning soon was carried to unreasonable lengths. In People
V. Stevens, 6 8 a woman suspected of smuggling marijuana into the state
penitentiary was taken from the prison lobby to a conference room,
where she was questioned for one half-hour by several prison officials
and subsequently made a confession. 6 9 Over a vigorous dissent byJustice Erickson (in which he emphasized his apparent pique with a fortyone case string cite), the court held that the confession did not result
from an illegal arrest made without probable cause, but rather was derived through proper questioning during a "temporary detention for
field investigation.' '70 In a subsequent habeas corpus action, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals needed only a short paragraph to "dispel any
7
notion that this was a Terry-type detention." '
As the composition of the court changed after Stevens, the limits of
the so-called Stone stop were more sharply, and narrowly, delineated. In
cases such as People v. Tooker, 7 2 People v. Schreyer,73 and People v.
64. 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971).
65. Id. at 508. The language in Stone does not precisely mirror that of Teiny. Under
Slone, to lawfully detain an individual for questioning, the court created the "Stone area,"
announcing the following standard: "(1) the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that
the individual has committed, or is about to commit, a crime; (2) the purpose of the detention must be reasonable; and (3) the character of the detention must be reasonable when
considered in light of the purpose." 174 Colo. at 509, 485 P.2d at 497.
66. J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 10:15 (1982) (quoting United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d 45, 63 (2d Cir. 1977)).
67. People v. Gurule, 175 Colo. 512, 515, 488 P.2d 889, 890 (1971) (emphasis
added).
68. 183 Colo. 399, 517 P.2d 1336 (1973), re,'d sub nora., Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d
867 (10th Cir. 1976).
69. 183 Colo. at 402, 517 P.2d at 1337-38.
70. 183 Colo. at 405, 517 P.2d at 1339.
71.

534 F.2d at 870 (state court erred in determining voluntariness of confession, not

ihe illegality of arrest).
72. 198 Colo. 496, 601 P.2d 1388 (1979).
73. 640 11.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982).
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Hazelhurst,7 4 the court repeatedly emphasized that only a brief line of
questioning is permitted in a Stone stop. 75 In none of these cases did the
court even hint that such questioning in a Stone stop amounted to custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 76 Indeed, a sentence in
Schreyer seemed to indicate just the opposite. "Terry," the court said
through Justice Erickson, "upheld the lawfulness of certain brief police
stops based upon a standard of less than probable cause for the traditional arrest or custodial interrogation."77 Thus, as late as 1982, the court
seemed to be distinguishing between an investigatory stop and custodial
interrogation. Within a year that distinction would be considerably
blurred.
B.

Custodial Interrogation in Colorado

The Colorado history of "custodial interrogation" has been similarly tortuous. Although Miranda had replaced the "focus of investigation" test of Escobedo v. Illinois78 with a standard requiring police officers
to advise suspects of their rights after being "taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way,' 79 early
Colorado Miranda-tvpe cases combined the two tests. In People v. Or,80
for example, the court cited both Miranda and Escobedo in suppressing
statements made by the defendant because "the investigation at this
time 'focused' on the defendant and only the defendant." 8 1 In People v.
Algien, 8 2 however, the court strictly construed the Miranda analysis and
stated that, in determining whether someone was in custody, "the objective test should be applied, that is, whether under the circumstances a
74. 662 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1983).
75. As stated in Shreyer: "Any temporary police detention made for the purpose of
questioning a suspect who might otherwise escape is limited to determining an individual's
identity or obtaining an explanation of his behavior." 640 P.2d at 1150 (citations
omitted).
76. Arguably, such a hint did occur in People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo.
1982), where Justice Quinn (now Chief Justice) remanded the case to the district court to
determine if a proper seizure had occurred. He clarified the appropriate standard by
stating:
['1]he issue whether a person has been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment must be resolved by an objective standard-that is whether "in view of all
the circumstance surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." This objective standard is consistent with
Colorado case law on the meaning of "custody" for purposes of the Viraiida
warning.
659 P.2d at 1350 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) and
citing People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972) and People v. Marioneaux, 618
P.2d 678 (Colo. App. 1980)).
'he distinction between the objective standard to determine custody and the objective standard to determine seizure is recognized, although not explicitly, in I W. IxFAv'E &
. lSRAIE, CRIMINAl. PROCEDURE § 6.6(c) (1984) (noting the similarity between the two
standards but not equating the two).
77. 640 P.2d at 1149 (emphasis added).
78. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a discussion ofEsobedo, see spra notes 13-14 and acconipanying text.
79. .lirawla, 384 U.S. at 444.
80. 172 Colo. 253, 472 P.2d 123 (1970).
81. Id. at 260, 472 P.2d at 127.
82. 180 Colo. I,501 P.2d 468 (1972).
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reasonable man would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom in
83
any significant way."
Three years later, then ChiefJustice Pringle authored an opinion in
People v. Parada84 which should have ended the confusion once and for
all:
[W]hether Miranda warnings are required in a particular situation depends on a threshold determination that the interrogation is "custodial." While "custodial" does not necessarily
refer to a police station investigation ...

it does require that the

interrogation be conducted under circumstances where a person "has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.... Thus, the thrust of
Miranda substituted the "custodial interrogation" requirement
for the "focus of the investigation" test which had earlier been
enunciated ....

85

Yet, less than one year after Parada, the Colorado Supreme Court
86
seemed to drift back to an Escobedo-type analysis. In People v. Thornton,
the only Colorado case dealing directly with the issue of whether Miranda warnings are required in a Stone stop, police stopped a car for a
traffic infraction, a vehicle which matched the description of the "getaway car" in a recent burglary of a construction site. 8 7 Noticing some
wet, mud-covered welding equipment in the back seat, the officer questioned the driver, who claimed that the equipment was his and had been
in the car all day. 8 8 The driver was then arrested. 89 Justice Erickson's
opinion for the court, while acknowledging that the officer did not have
probable cause at the time of the stop, nevertheless concluded that
[t]he police did ... possess sufficient information to raise a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of this vehicle may have
been involved in the reported burglary. When the police saw
the acetylene tanks and other welding equipment in the back
seat of the car, further inquiry was in order. The responses of
the defendant were made during the investigatory, not the accusatory
stage of this criminal proceeding, and the Miranda warnings were,
83.

Id. at 7, 501 P.2d at 471.

84. 188 Colo. 230, 533 P.2d 1121 (1975).
85. Id. at 233-34, 533 P.2d at 1122-23 (citations omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444). The Colorado Supreme Court went on to note that
[slince neither party asserts that Parada was "taken into custody" at the time of
questioning, the question before this Court is whether she was "'deprived of (her)
freedom of action in any significant way." Resolution of this question turns on
whether she reasonably believed that she was not free to leave.... In Hall,Judge
Friendly, writing for the court, explained this test. He stated: "[In the absence
of actual arrest, something must be said or done by the authorities, either in their
manner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates
that they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do
so.
Id. at 1122-23 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d
Cir. 1969)).

86. 190 Colo. 397, 547 P.2d 1278 (1976).
87. Id. at 399, 547 P.2d at 1280.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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therefore, not necessary.9 0
In subsequent cases, however, the court resumed reliance on the objective test for establishing custody set forth in Algien " ' and Parada,)2 and
such was the state of the law when the Colorado Supreme Court decided
People v. Johnson9 3 late in 1983.
C.

The Fifth is the Fourth and the Fourth isthe Fifth: People v. Johnson

In People v. Johnson, a plain clothes sheriff's investigator went to the
place of employment of one Evan Dean Johnson, who had been named
by a burglary victim as a possible suspect. 94 The investigator, who had
no visible weapon and was dressed in plain clothes, asked Johnson to
step outside, and he complied. 9 5 The female investigator identified herself as a law enforcement officer and told him she desired to talk to him
about the burglary. 9 6 After the defendant, in response to a question,
denied any knowledge of the burglary, the officer asked the defendant if
he would submit to a polygraph test.9 7 "The defendant looked down at

his feet for ten to twenty seconds, appeared as if he was going to cry,
and said 'I guess I might as well tell you, I did it.' -98 The defendant was
immediately advised pursuant to Miranda, signed a waiver form regarding those rights, and gave the investigator a written statement admitting
his involvement in the crime. 9 9 After making that statement, he was
00
taken from his place of employment to jail.1
In ruling to suppress this statement and a written confession made
subsequent to Miranda warnings, the trial court made no finding as to
whether the defendant was in custody, basing its decision simply on the
notion that an advisement must be given "before someone asks that ultimate question."''
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether the
defendant was in custody at the time he incriminated himself.' 0 2 The
court reviewed several United States and Colorado Supreme Court
90. Id. at 400, 547 P.2d at 1280 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thornton has
not been explicitly overruled. But see People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 590 n. 12 (Colo. 1981)
(court declines to consider whether police considered the defendant a suspect; Thoniton
distinguished on its facts), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1182 (1982). Lee has recently been cited
with approval on its facts. See People v. Clements, 665 P.2d 624, 625 (Colo. 1983) (anticipating Berkemer in holding Miranda warnings not required in routine traffic stops). The
court has soundly rejected as misplaced its reliance on the investigatory-accusatory distinction. See Lee, 630 P.2d at 588-90.
91. 172 Colo. 253, 260, 472 P.2d 123, 127 (1970).
92. 190 Colo. 397, 400, 547 P.2d 1278, 1280 (1976). See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez,
198 Colo. 118, 119, 596 P.2d 759, 760 (1979).
93. 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983), aft'd, 681 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1984).
94. 671 P.2d at 959.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 959-60.
99. Id. at 960.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 965.
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cases defining custody, reiterrating that the objective test of Algien and
Paradaapplied when making a custody determination. ' 0 3 Then, prefacing the court's forthcoming equation of "seizure" with "custody," it
asserted:
This objective standard is consistent with the decisions of this
court and the United States Supreme Court which construe the
word "seizure" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
[The] test is whether under the circumstances surrounding the
incident a reasonable
man would have believed that he was not
0 4
free to leave.1

By this statement, the court had imported fourth amendment doctrine
to the analysis of the fifth amendment custody issue. It did so without
apparent consideration of the very different policies which underly the
two amendments. Rather, the court seemed to "accord talismanic
power"' 1 5 to the phrase "whether a reasonable man would have believed that he was not free to leave," the test which the court had
adopted in the fifth amendment context in People v. Parada,106 and in the
fourth amendment context in People v. Pancoast.10 7 Nor did the Johnson
court leave any room to believe that it was merely analogizing; its equation of the two concepts was emphatic: "the standards to be employed
in determining the meaning of 'custody' under the Fifth Amendment for
purposes of Miranda and 'seizure' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment are identical... "108 Although the objective standard had previously been applied by the Colorado court to determine both custody
and seizure questions, the court's equation of the two concepts obscures
and conflicts with the teachings of the United States Supreme Court as
exemplified by Berkemer.
If, afterJohnson, "seizure" and "custody" are synonymous, then the
central question remains: are Miranda warnings required prior to any
questioning in a Stone stop? A Stone stop is, of course, a seizure under
the fourth amendment,' 0 9 and the test for determining whether a
103. Id. at 960-61.
104. Id. at 961 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)): People v.
Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo. 1982); People v.Bookman, 646 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1982)).
105. Berkemer v. McCarthy, 104 S. Ct. at 3149.
106. 188 Colo. at 234, 533 P.2d at 1123.
107. 659 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. 1982) (objective test applied to determine timing of
defendant's arrest). See also People v. Lewis, 659 P.2d 676, 681 n.3 (Colo. 1983).
108. 67i P.2d at 962 (emphasis added). On remand, "[tihe trial court found the conduct of the investigator was not such as to indicate to a reasonable person that he was in
custody, with the exception, however, of the question regarding the polygraph exam." Id.
Additionally, the trial court stated that "[a]ll but the specific question [concerning the
polygraph request] that we are dealing with was not that coercive .... People v. Johnson,
681 P.2d 524, 525 n.3 (Colo. 1984) aff'g 671 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1983). The court's brief per
cunamo decision affirmed the trial court's ruling suppressing the admission because its finding that he was in custody was "supported by the record." Id. at 525. Thus, the court had
endorsed a ruling that a mere question, absent any indicia of coercion, could render a
situation as "custodial." One month later, however, the court held that it was error to
focus "essentially on one circumstance only" in determining whether a suspect is in custody. See People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 202-03 (Colo. 1984).
109. See Stone v.People, 174 Colo. at 508, 485 P.2d at 497; seealso supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
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seizure has occurred applies to Stone stops as well as arrests. As the
court said in Lewis v. People, I10 "Pancoast and Bookman make clear that we
adopted Mendenhall's objective or reasonable person standard to all
forms of police intrusions constituting a 'seizure' of the person, includIl
ing temporary detentions.""'
Now, after Johnson, the question that
must be answered by the Colorado Supreme Court is when will Miranda
warnings be required?
The question, whether Miranda warnings are required in a Stone
1
stop, was neatly framed, though not answered, in People v. Wells. 12
There a police officer on an early morning routine patrol of a warehouse
complex observed that the defendant "had backed up his vehicle, with
the trunk open, against a tractor-trailer and appeared to be pulling on
the gate handle of the trailer."' 13 Moments later, as the defendant was
leaving, "[t]he officer drove to the side of the defendant's vehicle, rolled
down his window, and told the defendant to 'hold on a second.' " 14
The officer then asked what the defendant was doing there and the defendant replied that he was looking for a job.'5 An identification check
disclosed an outstanding warrant for the defendant, who was arrested
and searched.' 16 Further investigation disclosed that the tractor-trailer
l1 7
had been entered unlawfully.
The defendant questioned only the validity of the initial stop, a
challenge which the court rejected.' 18 In a footnote, however, the court
pointedly stated that, as the issue had not been raised before the district
court, it could not consider "whether the defendant's statement to [the
officer] at the scene was the result of custodial interrogation which
should have been preceded by a proper advisement of the defendant's
Miranda rights."' 19 The court then cited Miranda and Johnson. 120 In
110. 659 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1983).
111. Id. at 681. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), involved a confrontation between federal agents and the defendant in the public concourse of an airport.
The Court applied the objective standard in determining that the circumstance surrounding the contact did not amount to a seizure. Id. at 553-56.
112. 676 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1984).
113. Id.at 700.
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id

117. Id.
118. The court stated:
The total circumstances observed by the officer immediately prior to the stopthe defendant's physical action in attempting to forcibly open the trailer door and
his obvious effort to leave the scene as the officer entered the parking lot-constitute a sufficiently particularized basis in fact for stopping the defendant in order
to briefly investigate the circumstances of his conduct.
Id. at 702. But see People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (1983) ("Even when the act of running
[from police] is motivated by an effort to avoid contact with the police, it still does rlot
constitute the type of specific and articulable fact that is constitutionally sufficient to justify
a stop."); People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo.) (stop to determine whether burglary
has been committed when no criminal acts have been reported to police is constitutionally
impermissible), cert. granted, Colorado v. Quintero, 103 S. Ct. 3535, cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct.
543 (1983) (due to death of defendant).
119. 676 P.2d at 702 n.3.
120. Id. at 702.
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light of Johnson, the trial court could have only answered the question
posed by the footnote in the affirmative. Thus, afterJohnson, but before
Berkener, the Colorado Supreme Court appeared poised to require that
police officers, before any inquiry into reasonably suspicious activity,
must advise suspects of the right to remain silent. 12 1 The Johnson holding, if interpreted literally, presents a threat to traditional law enforcement procedures in Colorado by effectively eliminating the distinction
between seizure and custody, potentially creating fifth amendment protections in situations not contemplated by the Supreme Court in Miranda and its progeny.
III.

JOH\soN's PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AFTER BERKEME)

The confusion engendered in the lower courts by the uncertain validity of the Johnson analysis has been evident in recent decisions of the
Colorado Court of Appeals. In People v. Harris,12 2 fragments of a parking light scattered about the scene of a fatal accident led a police officer
to suspect that the defendant's car was involved in the fatal accident on
the previous day. 123 The officer followed the defendant's car to a parking lot. The officer requested the defendant's identification and asked
him whether he had been involved in any accidents in the last twentyfour hours. 124 The defendant's response led to several more questions. 2 5 The court of appeals held that the trial court had erred "as a
matter of law" in finding that the defendant was not in custody during
this conversation. 1 26 As support, the court cited Pancoast for its view
that "[a] person is in custody for Miranda purposes if, in view of all the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free
127
to leave."'
Oddly, the court ignored Johnson entirely, citing Pancoast, a fourth
amendment seizure case as support for the fifth amendment custody
standard. The court's ruling in Harris is also at odds with precedent in
that it seemingly relies on the officer's state of mind in determining the
custody issue. 128 Thus, while the result in Harris is not necessarily erroneous, since the defendant was possibly in custody, the analysis applied
by the court clearly was not in accord with precedent.
Even more striking was the Colorado Court of Appeals' attempt to
121. Even before Berkemer. such a ruling would have been at odds with the overwhelming weight of precedent on this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286
(9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1211, (1983). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND

SEIZURE § 9.2 & n.66 (Supp. 1984) ("The courts have generally concluded that police
questioning outside the station house is not 'custodial'..."); 2 W. RINGEI., SEARCHES AN)
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 27.3(a)(3) & n.55 (1984) ("Courts are also virtually
unanimous in finding that questioning of a suspect during an investigative stop authorized
under Tei, v. Ohio . . . does not meet the requirement of custodial interrogation.").
122. 763 P.2d 667 (Colo. App. 1985).

123. Id. at 669-70.
124.

Id.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 669.
127. Id.
128.

Id. at 670.
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wrestle with Johnson in People v. Koolbeck. 129 In Koolbeck, the defendant
was asked to get into the police officer's car while the officer investigated
a burglary.' 3 0 The defendant was not free to leave. In response to general inquiries, the defendant made some arguably incriminating statements."3' The court cited bothJohnson and Pancoast as the basis for its
employment of an objective standard: "whether a person has been
'seized' under the fourth amendment and thus is in custody for the purposes of the fifth amendment is an objective standard."' 132 Yet, the
court then held that the brief detention involved was a Terry/Stone
stop,] 33 which meant that although the defendant was not free to leave,
and therefore had been seized, his seizure was temporary and did not
amount to an arrest. Following through on its misplaced analysis, the
court concluded that the police officer's detention was a lawful Stone
stop, and therefore, "a Miranda warning was not necessary for the questions asked."' 13 4 While this is an arguably correct interpretation of
Berkemer, it is totally inconsistent with Johnson. If seizure equals custody,
then Miranda warnings would have logically been required in Koolbeck.
Perhaps Judge Babcock, author of the Koolbeck opinion, was making a
good faith effort to reach the correct result, but failed to force the aberrant holding of Johnson into the orthodox mold.
People v. Black,' 35 indicates that the Colorado Supreme Court is unaware of the effect of Berkemer on its holding in Johnson. In Black, the court
suppressed statements made by a suspect at the scene of a vehicular
crime, correcting a trial court that had resurrected the "focus of the investigation" test from Escobedo. 136 Correctly, the court stated that Mi3 7
randa had substituted a custodial analysis for Escobedo's "focus" test.1
Citing Johnson twice, the court held that the subjective mindset of the
police officer is simply not relevant to the issue of custody.1 3 8 In a footnote, the court cited Berkemer in support of this proposition. 139 There is
no recognition in the opinion that Berkemer had effectively rejectedJohnson's holding that seizure and custody are identical.
CONCLUSION

The validity of Johnson is at best uncertain in light of the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Berkemer. Although the Colorado court
is free to interpret the Colorado Constitution more strictly than the
United States Constitution, and has not hesitated to do so in the past,'14
129. 703 P.2d 673 (Colo. App. 1985).
130. Id. at 667.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 668.
133. Id. (citing People v. Shreyer, 640 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982)).
134. Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

698 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1985).
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 768 n.6.
See, e.g., People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1985) (extending fourth amendment
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People v. Johnson was decided under the federal Constitution and therefore appears to be an inadvertent mixing of doctrinal analysis rather
than a bold departure from federal precedent. To remedy this flawed
interpretation, the Colorado Supreme Court must either recognize its
error in Johnson and adopt an analysis consistent with orthodox
Terry/Mirandadoctrine as illustrated by Berkemer, or embraceJohnson and
anchor its equation of seizure with custody as the law under the Colorado Constitution. The latter would effectively emasculate the "stop
and frisk" as a law enforcement tool.
While the Johnson holding affects only one issue of criminal procedure, those unfamiliar with criminal litigation may not appreciate the
practical significance of the problem created by the case. Every criminal
trial lawyer knows that statements made during the first few moments of
contact with a police officer are crucial. A person's off-hand remark, or
response to a police officer's general questioning, made when the fear of
being caught is most intense and before time has given an opportunity
to craft a careful explanation, can be essential in proving a criminal
charge. Koolbeck, Wells, Harris,and Berkemer all provide vivid illustrations
of this fact. The admissibility of such statements is almost always conditioned on applying the distinct teachings of Terry and Miranda.
The Colorado Supreme Court should recognize Johnson as a deviation from traditional Terry/Miranda analysis which significantly changes
police conduct in "stop and frisk" situations. Acknowledging Johnson's
conflict with entrenched practice, the Colorado Supreme Court should
give lower courts and practicing lawyers some additional guidance. As it
stands now,Johnson theoretically requires police officers to "Mirandize"
virtually anyone they contact under even remotely suspicious circumstances. 14 1 This result could hardly have been contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Miranda. Indeed, ChiefJustice Warren in Terry recognized that the "stop and frisk" is a legitimate investigative tool that carefully balances society's need for law enforcement against the individual's
14 2
right to be left alone.
Acknowledging the Stone stop as an effective tool of law enforcement, the Colorado Supreme Court should qualify Johnson and correct
its erroneous ruling. Such a course would return Colorado to a more
sensible interpretation of fourth and fifth amendment precedent, permitting law enforcement personnel to continue to work with familiar
protection under the Colorado Constitution not found to exist in the United States
Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Karot, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), which held a
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to a beeper placed
in a steel drum); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (extending protection
under the Colorado Constitution for pen registers in opposition to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)): Charnes v. DiGiacomo. 200 Colo. 94.
612 P.2d 1117 (1980) (extending protection under the Colorado Constitution to bank
records not found to exist in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
141. [he authors have been informed in at least one jurisdiction in Colorado the District Attorney has instructed law enforcement personnel to "Mirandiz'c" every person they
have contact with in a criminal investigation.
142. 392 U.S. at 20-21.
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standards that in no way compromise defendants' fifth amendment
rights. Admittedly, the orthodox Teny/Miranda analysis is not always
easy and there are no bright lines. Such an analysis ultimately requires
careful, fact-specific determinations made not by "according talismanic
power" to a simple precedential phrase, but rather, as in Berkemer, by
appreciating and applying the underlying tenets of the fourth and fifth
amendments. Only through this type of analysis can the court give due
deference to both the legitimate needs of law enforcement as recognized
in Terry, and the fifth amendment principles embodied in Miranda.

